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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: IMPEACHMENT
EXCEPTION BROADENED TO INCLUDE STATEMENTS
FIRST ELICITED UPON CROSS-EXAMINATION-
UNITED STATES V. HAVENS
The United States Constitution establishes an unequivocal prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.' To enforce this prohibition,
the Supreme Court has prescribed an exclusionary rule which provides that
evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure may not be
used to establish guilt in criminal trials.2  The rule was designed to discour-
age police misconduct in acquiring evidence 3 and to preserve judicial
integrity' by refusing to implicitly sanction illegal police activity.
1. The fourth amendment states:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See
generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 165-169 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE].
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule was promulgated under the Court's supervisory
power over lower federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Weeks
Court explained:
[T]he Fourth Amendment . . . put the courts of the United States and Federal
Officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and re-
straints [and] . . . forever secure[d] the people, their persons, houses, papers and
effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law....
[T]he duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our
Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.
Id. at 391-92. The exclusionary rule was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
3. Deterrence has evolved as the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule. See, e.g.,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting) (suppression of evidence imperative to deter impropriety in law en-
forcement); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1968) (exclusionary rule is principal mode of
discouraging police lawlessness); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965) (Mapp exclu-
sionary rule is only effective deterrent to lawless police actions); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
656 (1961) (purpose of exclusionary rule is to compel respect for constitutional guarantee by
deterrence of unlawful police conduct in gathering evidence); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217-18 (1960) (rule calculated to deter unlawful behavior by removing incentive to disre-
gard it).
4. Justice Brandeis enunciated the judicial integrity rationale in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 483-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). He reasoned that the courts should
refuse to assist law enforcement authorities who themselves violated the law. Id. at 484. This
rationale was later accepted by a majority of the Court in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 345 (1943), and was re-affirmed in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960)
(exclusionary rule needed to promote judicial integrity), Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659
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The effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a means of achieving these
dual goals has, however, been questioned.' The Supreme Court, noting the
rule's deficiencies and desiring to protect other interests, has recognized ex-
ceptions to the rule. One such exception permits the use of illegally seized
evidence to impeach a defendant's direct testimony." Recently, in United
States v. Havens,7 a five justice majority expanded the scope of this excep-
tion. The Havens Court held that illegally seized evidence also may be used
to impeach a defendant's credibility during cross-examination, provided that
the cross-examination eliciting the challenged statements was reasonably
suggested by the defendant's direct testimony.8
Close examination of the Havens decision reveals that the Court departed
from precedent to thwart the application of the exclusionary rule. Due to
this departure, the Havens expansion of the impeachment exception could
have a chilling effect both upon the willingness of defendants to testify and
upon the deterrence of official lawlessness. Because the Court failed to pre-
scribe an alternative to the exclusionary rule, it is suggested that the Su-
preme Court reemphasize the normative and factual considerations that ori-
ginally necessitated the rule.
EVOLUTION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Development of the Rule
At common law, evidence procurred unlawfully was not excluded.' The
first explicit enunciation of the exclusionary rule appeared in Weeks v.
United States." The Weeks decision, pronounced under the Court's super-
visory power," held that evidence obtained in an unlawful search is not
admissible to establish a defendant's guilt in federal prosecutions. 2 That-
(1961) (nothing destroys a government more quickly than disregard of its charter), and Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968) (courts will not be party to invasions of constitutional rights).
5. For criticism of the exclusionary rule, see Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14
AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1964); Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REV.
80 (1969); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 665
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks].
6. See notes 33-46 and accompanying text infra.
7. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
8. Id. at 627-28. The Federal Rules of Evidence limit the scope of cross-examination
to the subject matter of the direct examination and to matters affecting credibility. FED. R.
EviD. 611.
9. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 165, at 365; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183, at 6
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
10. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Prior to Weeks, dictum in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), suggested that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment should be in-
admissible at trial in federal courts. In Boyd, the Court held that reliable evidence probative of
a defendant's guilt was inadmissible because the government obtained it under a statute viola-
tive of the fourth amendment. Id. at 638.
11. See note 2 supra.
12. 232 U.S. at 398.
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principle was soon extended to prohibit any use of evidence derived from
illegal searches and seizures.13
In Mapp v. Ohio,'" the Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule
beyond an exercise of the Court's supervisory power and held that the rule
was a constitutional mandate of the fourth amendment.' 5 In addition, the
Mapp decision applied the rule to the states as an element of procedural due
process." After Mapp, the Court grafted the exclusionary rule onto fifth"
and sixth"6 amendment violations as well.
In designing the exclusionary rule, the Court relied upon both normative
and factual justifications.", The normative rationale emphasizes the "impera-
tive of judicial integrity." 2 Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead v. United States,"
13. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The Court in
Silverthorne stated: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that
it shall not be used at all." Id. at 392.
14. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Mapp decision overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). In Wolf, the Court held that although the fourth amendment, as applied to the states,
restricted state officials from violating the constitutional rights incorporated through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the fourth amendment did not require state courts
to exclude illegally obtained evidence. Id. at 33.
15. Prior to Mapp, the Court recognized the rule in its supervisory function. See note 2
supra. In Mapp, the Court reasoned that: "[Olur holding that the exclusionary rule is an essen-
tial part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is not only the logical dictate of prior
cases, but it also makes very good sense, There is no war between the Constitution and com-
mon sense." 367 U.S. at 657. See generally Note, Impeachment by Unconstitutionally Obtained
Evidence-The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 706 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Note].
16. 367 U.S. at 657.
17. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (statements taken without requisite safe-
guards must be excluded in accordance with privilege against self-incrimination).
18. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (in-court identification excluded if
tainted by pre-trial confrontation where accused was denied right to presence of counsel);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (statements elicited from suspect in police custody
who was refused opportunity to consult with counsel may not be used against him at trial).
19. For an in-depth discussion of the policy rationales underlying the exclusionary rule, see
Oaks, supra note 5; Comment, The Exclusionary Rule in Context, 50 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Comment].
20. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). See note 4 supra.
21. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis, in his frequently quoted
dissent, stated:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be sub-
jected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a govern-
ment of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe
the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If
the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the ad-
ministration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the
Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this
Court should resolutely set its face.
Id. at 485.
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stressed the need to "preserve the judicial process from contamination" ' by
excluding illegally obtained evidence. He reasoned that this exclusion would
maintain respect for the law and promote public confidence in the adminis-
tration of justice.'
The factual justification for the rule suggests that by excluding illegally
obtained evidence, courts will deter law enforcement officials from behaving
illegally when performing criminal investigations.' The deterrence rationale
has predominated over the imperative of judicial integrity in most Supreme
Court decisions.25 On this basis, the Court has characterized the rule as the
only effective method of ensuring respect for the fourth amendment. 6
Creation of the Impeachment Exception
Despite the rule against the introduction of illegally seized evidence, the
Supreme Court has permitted the use of such evidence at trial solely for
purposes of impeaching a defendant's credibility. In an early decision,
Agnello v. United States, 7 the Court refused to allow illegally seized evi-
dence directly relating to the crime charged to be introduced for the pur-
pose of impeaching testimony first elicited on cross-examination.' Agnello,
charged with conspiracy to sell narcotics, testified on direct examination that
he had received packages from another defendant but was unaware they
contained cocaine.' On cross-examination, he testified that he had never
seen narcotics.- ° At this point in the cross-examination, the prosecutor was
permitted to introduce in rebuttal a can of cocaine illegally seized from
Agnello's room to impeach Agnello's credibility." A unanimous Court re-
versed Agnello's conviction and ruled that the evidence was not admissible
for impeachment under these circumstances.2
22. Id. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23. Id.
24. A leading commentary on the exclusionary rule proposed that the ultimate test of the
rule will be its effectiveness as a deterrent to objectionable police practices. Allen, Due Process
and State Criminal Procedures; Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 16, 34 (1953). See note 3
supra.
25. See notes 3 & 4 supra.
26. In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), the Court proclaimed that the only
effective way to compel respect for the fourth amendment was to remove the incentive to
disregard it. Thus, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961), the Court classified the exclu-
sionary rule as a "deterrent safeguard, without insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment
would have been reduced to a 'form of words.'
27. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
28. Id. at 35.
29. Id. at 29.
30. Id. at 30.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 35. The Court, reversing Agnello's conviction, stated:
In his direct examination, Agnello was not asked and did not testify concerning the
can of cocaine. In cross-examination, in answer to a question permitted over his
[Vol. 30:223
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Almost 30 years later, however, the Court in Walder v. United States'
recognized an exception to the exclusionary rule for the impeachment of
testimony elicited on direct examination. The Walder defendant was charged
with the unlawful sale of narcotics but asserted upon direct examination, and
reiterated upon cross-examination, that he had never possessed or sold
narcotics.- The Court upheld the collateral use of illegally seized evidence
to impeach the defendant's credibility.' The Court reasoned that the defen-
dant's testimony extended beyond a mere denial of involvement in the
crimes in question and his "sweeping claims" 3 offered during direct testi-
mony "opened the door"3 7 to impeachment during cross-examination by un-
constitutionally obtained evidence." The Walder Court was careful to dis-
tinguish its decision from Agnello, and emphasized the difference between
the impeachment of statements first elicited on cross-examination and im-
peachment of testimony volunteered during direct examination.39 The Court
noted that in Agnello the prosecution, after failing in its efforts to introduce
the tainted evidence in its case in chief, attempted to smuggle it in on cross-
examination.'
In Harris v. New York,4 1 the Court extended the Walder impeachment
exception to include fifth amendment violations, and ruled that pretrial
statements, inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief, may be used to
impeach the defendant's direct testimony. 2 In Harris, the defendant was
objection, he said he had never seen it. He did nothing to waive his constitutional
protection or to justify cross-examination in respect of the evidence claimed to have
been obtained by the search.
Id. Further, the Court reiterated the basic exclusionary rule-"unlawfully obtained evidence
may not be used for any purpose." Id. (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1930)).
33. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
34. In an effort to impeach Walder's credibility, the prosecution was permitted to question
Walder about heroin seized from his home two years earlier. Id. at 64.
35. The Court limited use of the Walder exception to those situations in which a defendant's
direct testimony exceeds denial of the crime charged and includes collateral matters. The Court
declared: "[Tihe Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusa-
tion against him . . . without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of
rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief." Id. at
65.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 64.
38. The Court observed that the impeachment exception would discourage defendants from
consciously resorting to perjurous testimony when they take the stand in reliance on the Gov-
ernment's inability to challenge their credibility. Id. at 65.
39. Id. at 66. The Walder Court distinguished its holding from Agnello on an additional
ground; in Agnello, the impeaching evidence was pertinent to the crime charged, while in
Walder the evidence was collateral to the elements of the crime charged. Id. See generally 3
LAFAvE, supra note 2, at 701-02.
40. 347 U.S. at 66.
41. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
42. Id. at 225-26.
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asked on cross-examination whether he had made specific statements to the
police immediately following his arrest. In response to this cross-
examination, Harris testified that he could not remember any of the ques-
tions or answers elicited during his interrogation. Following the cross-
examination, the prosecutor was permitted to impeach the defendant by
reading excerpts from inconsistent pretrial statements otherwise inadmissible
because of police failure to give Miranda warnings.' The Court, relying on
the principles set forth in Walder," reasoned that the benefits of the im-
peachment process should not be lost due to the speculative possibility that
impermissible police misconduct will be encouraged."3 The Harris Court
opined that police malfeasance will be discouraged when the evidence in
question is unavailable for the prosecution to use in its case in chief."5 The
Harris decision, by abandoning the materiality distinction whereby impeach-
ment was permitted only of testimonial matters collateral to the crime for
which the defendant was charged, has had a further impact on the con-
tinuing vitality of the Agnello-Walder rule. 7 In regard to this distinction,
the Harris Court abrogated a general rule that illegally seized evidence
could not be used to impeach a defendant's denial of the crime.4
Prior to Havens, the scope of the Walder exception to the exclusionary
43. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Court indicated that
pretrial statements obtained in violation of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination could not be offered into evidence, even collaterally, to impeach a defendant's
credibility. The Court reasoned that statements by the defendant which are intended to be
exculpatory but are used to impeach his testimony are incriminatory and therefore may not be
used without full warnings and effective waiver. Id. at 476-77.
44. There were, however, important differences between Walder and Harris. In Walder,
the defendant was impeached by evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment re-
garding matters unrelated to the crime for which he was charged. 347 U.S. at 65. On the other
hand, in Harris the defendant was impeached by pretrial statements obtained in violation of the
fifth amendment regarding matters bearing more directly on the crime in question. 401 U.S. at
225. The Harris Court maintained that it was following the general rule set forth in Walder and
extending it slightly to apply to the facts in Harris. The Harris Court, however, quoted Walder
in a highly selective manner, omitting any refierence to the Walder principle that a defendant
"must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave to
the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it .... 347 U.S.
at 65.
45. 401 U.S. at 225 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)).
46. Id. The Harris decision was re-affirmed by the Burger Court in Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714 (1975), in which the Court held that the defendant's direct testimony could be im-
peached by a prior inconsistent statement otherwise inadmissible.
47. For a general discussion of the impact of the Harris extension to the impeachment
exception on the exclusionary rule, see Dershcwitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious
Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198
(1971) (hereinafter cited as Dershowitz & Ely]; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, Admissibility of
Unlawfully Obtained Statement for Impeachment Purposes, 85 HABv. L. REV. 44 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court, 1970 Term].
48. See Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 47, at 1214; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra
note 47, at 48.
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rule was limited to impeachment of testimony first elicited on direct ex-
amination. The Harris Court, while extending the Walder rule to include
fifth amendment violations, did not address the issue of whether the im-
peachment exception should be broadened to encompass testimony first eli-
cited on cross-examination. Lower federal courts have recognized a clear
distinction between impeachment of direct examination and cross-
examination testimony and have restricted the use of unlawfully acquired
evidence to impeachment of testimony first offered during direct
examination." These courts have maintained that in factual situations simi-
lar to Agnellol it is impermissible for the prosecution, by use of evidence
inadmissible in its case in chief, to rebut testimony extracted from the de-
fendant only on cross-examination. The restriction to direct examination
testimony avoids the problem, confronted by the Court in Agnello, s' of pros-
ecutorial "smuggling in" of tainted evidence.
THE HAVENS DECISION
Factual Background and Holding
J. Lee Havens and John McLeroth, both attorneys from Fort Wayne, In-
diana, arrived at the Miami Airport on a flight from Lima, Peru.5 2  In
Miami, McLeroth underwent a customs search that revealed cocaine sewed
into makeshift pockets in T-shirt he was wearing.' McLeroth told the cus-
toms officials that Havens was traveling with him, thereby implicating
Havens in the importation of cocaine.' Following Havens' arrest,, his lug-
gage was seized and searched without a warrant by customs agents.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Hickey, 596 F.2d 1082 (1st Cir.) (where defendant has not
testified as to subject matter during direct examination, suppressed evidence may not be used
to impeach statements elicited upon cross-examination), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853 (1979);
United States v. Whitson, 587 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1978) (where defendant presents case on
direct without raising issues open to impeachment, and Government cross-examines to elicit
impeachable statements, it is error to permit Government to impeach statements it induced
with inadmissible evidence); United States v. Mariani, 539 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1976) (topic eli-
cited solely by Government's cross-examination may not be rebutted by evidence which is
inadmissible in Government's case in chief); United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138 (9th Cir.
1974) (impeachment of defendant by illegally obtained evidence is erroneous where evidence
does not focus on truthfulness of direct testimony). See also People v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d 174,
501 P.2d 918, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1972) (harmful constitutional error to permit impeachment of
witness' statement elicited on cross-examination by illegally seized evidence where defendant
had not referred to these matters in direct testimony), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 863 (1973).
50. See note 32 and text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
51. Id.
52. 446 U.S. at 621.
53. Id. at 621-22.
54. Id. at 622.
55. Drug Enforcement Agency officers arrested Havens, who had cleared customs approx-
imately four hours earlier. Brief for Petitioner at 3, United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620
(1980).
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Although no controlled substance was discovered, agents found a T-shirt
from which swatches corresponding to the size of McLeroth's makeshift
pockets had been cut.' At trial, the T-shirt and other evidence were sup-
pressed because the search and seizure were illegal. 57
McLeroth testified for the government at Havens' trial and asserted that
Havens had supplied him with the altered T-shirt and had sewn the
makeshift pockets shut.s Havens, testifying in his own defense, denied any
involvement in smuggling cocaine.59 On cross-examination, the prosecutor
asked Havens whether he had anything to do with sewing the makeshift
pockets on McLeroth's T-shirt. Havens denied that he had. Additionally, the
prosecutor asked Havens whether he had the seized T-shirt in his luggage.
Havens again denied any knowledge about the T-shirt. After the defense
rested, the customs agent was recalled as a rebuttal witness."0 Over an
objection, the agent was permitted to testify that the cut T-shirt was found
in Havens' suitcase."' Subsequently, the illegally seized T-shirt was admit-
56. 446 U.S. at 622.
57. Id.
58. id.
59. His direct testimony included the following:
Q. And you heard Mr. McLeroth testify earlier as to something to the effect that
this material was taped or draped around his body and so on, you heard that
testimony?
A. Yes I did.
Q. Did you ever engage in that kind of activity with Mr. McLeroth and Augusto or
Mr. McLeroth and anyone else on that fourth visit to Lima, Peru?
A. I did not.
On cross-examination, Havens testified as follows:
Q. Now, on direct examination, sir, you testified that on the fourth trip you had
absolutely nothing to do with the wrapping of any bandages or tee shirts or
anything involving Mr. McLeroth; is that correct?
A. I don't-I said I had nothing to do with any wrapping or bandages or anything,
yes. I had nothing to do with anything with Mr. McLeroth in connection with
this cocaine matter.
Q. And your testimony is that you had nothing to do with the sewing of cotton
swatches to make pockets on that tee shirt?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Sir, when you came through customs, the Miami International Airport, on Octo-
ber 2, 1977, did you have in your suitcase size 38-40 medium tee shirts?
An objection to the latter question was overruled and questioning continued:
Q. On that day, sir, did you have in your luggage a size 38-40 medium man's tee
shirt with swatches of clothing missing from the tail of that tee shirt?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Mr. Havens, I'm going to hand you what is Government Exhibit 9 for identifica-
tion and ask you if this tee shirt was in your luggage on October 2nd, 1975
[sic]?
A. Not to my knowledge. No.
Id. at 622-23.
60. Id. at 623.
61. The appellate court pointed out the trial court's previous ruling that if Havens admitted
on cross-examination that the T-shirt was in his luggage, it could not be introduced into evi-
ted into evidence for impeachment purposes with appropriate instructions to
the jury.6' Havens was convicted in federal district court of importing, con-
spiring to import, and intentionally possessing cocaine.'5
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed Havens' conviction,'
holding that illegally seized evidence may be used for impeachment only if
the evidence contradicts a particular statement made by the defendant in
the course of his or her direct examination.' The court of appeals stated
that Agnello v. United States66 and Walder v. United States 7 set forth two
rules on the admissibility of illegally seized evidence. First, only statements
elicited on a defendant's direct examination can predicate the use of illegally
seized evidence for impeachment. Second, the evidence sought to be used
must contradict a particular statement made by the defendant."' The court
observed that an arguable conflict with the defendant's denial of guilt does
not meet this latter test.6' The United States Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings."0 In so
doing, it distinguished Agnello and held that a defendant's statement made
in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defen-
dant's direct testimony is subject to impeachment by evidence that has been
illegally obtained.
7
'
The Court's Rationale
The controversial decision in Havens appears to be the outcome of the
balancing of competing societal interests, such as protecting the public from
unconstitutional searches and seizures, deterring police misconduct,'7 pre-
venting perjured testimony, 3 preserving judicial integrity,74 and determining
truth through the adversarial process.5
dence. Because Havens denied it, the agent was allowed to testify to the contrary. United
States v. Havens, 592 F.2d 848, 850 (5th Cir. 1979).
62. The jury was instructed that the illegally obtained evidence was to be considered only
for impeaching Haven's credibility. Brief for Petitioner at 6.
63. Havens was prosecuted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 952(a), 960(a)(1), 963 (1976) and
under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
64. United States v. Havens, 592 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1979).
65. 592 F.2d at 851.
66. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
67. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
68. 592 F.2d at 851.
69. id.
70. 446 U.S. at 629.
71. Id. at 627-28.
72. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
73. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
74. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. For a general discussion of the societal in-
terests weighed in the Court's balancing process, see Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial
Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1129 (1973). See also Comment, supra note 19.
75. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975).
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Justice White, delivering the opinion for a five justice majority,'6 recog-
nized that earlier cases distinguished between impeachment of testimony
first elicited on cross-examination and impeachment of testimony offered
during direct examination." He viewed the distinction as erroneous and
protested that a flat rule permitting only impeachment of direct examination
testimony misinterpreted the underlying rationale of prior controlling
cases.7" Relying upon Walder, the majority interpreted AgnelloTh as holding
that impeachment by tainted evidence will be impermissible only when
cross-examination testimony has too tenuous a connection with any subject
covered on direct." The Court then pointed out that the court of appeals,
in reversing the district court decision, failed to consider how closely the
cross-examination related to matters elicited on direct.8
Despite the constitutional right of citizens to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures,82 the Court stated that the fundamental goal in crim-
inal trials is discovering the truth.' The majority insisted that when defen-
dants take the witness stand, they must testify truthfully or suffer the
consequences.' Further, the majority emphasized that this obligation con-
tinues during cross-examination. 5 In this regard, the Court maintained
there was no difference between a defendant's statements on direct examina-
76. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackman, Powell, and Rehnquist joined.
77. 446 U.S. at 625. The majority placed major emphasis on four previous decisions. The
first of these decisions, Agnello, prohibited the impeachment of testimony first brought out on
cross-examination. The other three cases-Walder, Hass and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971)-which were decided subsequent to Agnello, indicated that the impeachment exception
would apply only where contradictory testimony was first offered on direct examination.
78. The majority stated that Walder, Harris and Hass repudiated the statement in Agnello
that illegally obtained evidence may not be used at all. id.
79. See notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra.
80. 446 U.S. at 625.
81. Id. For this reason, the case was remanded for further proceedings.
82. See note 1 supra.
83. 446 U.S. at 626.
84. Id. Here, the Court stated that "this is true even though a defendant is compelled to
testify against his will." Id. Accord, Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) (one furnishing
false information to Government cannot defend against prosecution for fraud by challenging the
validity of requirement itself); United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969) (predicament of being
forced to choose between incriminating truth and falsehood, as opposed to refusing to answer,
does not justify perjury).
85. 446 U.S. at 627. The majority observed that the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination does not shield him from proper questioning. Accord, Brown v. United States,
356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958). The Court also noted that a defendant would unquestionably be
subject to perjury prosecution if he knowingly lied on cross-examination. Compare United
States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1976) (witness who falsely testifies before grand jury and is later
indicted for perjury is not entitled to suppression on fifth amendment grounds) with Bryson v.
United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) (one who elects fraudulent testimony as means of self-help for
improper questioning cannot escape prosecution for fraud).
tion and his or her responses elicited on cross-examination plainly within the
scope of direct testimony.6
Although emphasizing the need to obtain the truth in criminal trials, the
Havens decision still acknowledged the deterrence rationale that underlies
the exclusionary rule. 87 The Court observed that the policies promoted by
the exclusionary rule no more barred impeachment in Havens than they did
in previous decisions that recognized the impeachment exception for state-
ments elicited on direct examination.8 In those decisions the Court main-
tained that perjurous testimony should not go unchallenged."' The majority
then concluded that the deterrence rationale was adequately served in
Havens by denying the government use of the illegally seized evidence in its
case in chief.10
The Dissenting Opinion
The four dissenting justices"' characterized the Havens decision as an un-
warranted departure from controlling case law."' The Havens majority fo-
cused on general language in Agnello, concluding that the premise under-
lying Agnello was that illegally seized evidence should not be used at all
during trial.' Consequently, the majority understood Agnello to espouse an
absolute prohibition against the use of illegally seized evidence, and viewed
subsequent decisions that recognized exceptions to the rule as repudiations
of the Agnello rationale."
86. 446 U.S. at 627. See also 3 LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 703-05. But see note 49 and
accompanying text supra.
87. See note 3 supra.
88. 446 U.S. at 627. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971).
89. In Walder, the Court stated:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evi-
dence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn
the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained
to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his
untruths. Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of [it] ...
[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to per-
jurous testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credi-
bility.
347 U.S. at 65.
The Court in both Harris and Hass, relying on Walder, maintained that the shield provided
by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to offer perjurous testimony, free from con-
frontation with prior contradictory utterances. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 722; Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. at 226.
90. 446 U.S. at 626.
91. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justice Marshall and joined in part by Justices
Stewart and Stevens.
92. 446 U.S. at 629 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 624. More particularly, this principle was enunciated in Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), and quoted by the Court in Agnello, 269 U.S. at 35.
94. 446 U.S. at 624.
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The dissent construed Agnello more narrowly, and interpreted it as hold-
ing that the government may not employ the power of cross-examination to
predicate the admission of illegally obtained evidence.5 The dissent argued
that Agnello could be reconciled with later cases that recognized exceptions
to the exclusionary rule. It noted that the Court's recent decisions in Harris
and Hass, which allowed governmental use of inadmissible pretrial state-
ments to impeach direct testimony, did not intimate that Agnello had lost its
vitality." The dissenters further indicated that a meaningful distinction re-
mained between a defendant's sweeping and untrue claims beyond a mere
denial of involvement in the crimes charged 97 and a prosecutorial attempt to
smuggle in tainted evidence on cross-examination to elicit an expected
denial.' It is this distinction that underlies the Court's prior limitation of
the impeachment exception to testimony first volunteered on direct ex-
amination.
The dissent also disagreed with the outcome of the majority's balancing
process. While recognizing that the truth-finding function of a trial is impor-
tant, the dissent placed greater emphasis upon the normative objective that
trials be free from the implicit sanctioning of police impropriety.' Addi-
tionally, the dissent challenged the majority position that official misconduct
would be deterred adequately by merely denying the admissibility of tainted
evidence in the prosecution's case in chief.'° Finally, the dissent attacked
the analytical method employed by the Court as obscuring the difference
between judicial decision-making and legislative policy-making."I It claimed
that the majority was depreciating constitutional rights by subjecting those
rights to an ad hoc analysis rather than applying a firm exclusionary rule. °0
CRITICISM AND IMPACT
Havens represents the highwater mark in the trend of Burger Court deci-
sions that undermine the exclusionary rule as a device to safeguard constitu-
95. Id. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 28 supra.
96. 446 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. See notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text supra.
98. See note 39 supra.
99. 446 U.S. at 633 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan hoped that "the Court
would not ... acquiesce in torture or other police conduct that 'shocks the conscience' even if
it demonstrably advanced the factfinding process." Id. (source of quotation omitted from origi-
nal).
100. The majority relied on the rationale underlying Harris and Hass to support its applica-
tion of the impeachment exception to Havens. The Harris Court asserted: "The benefits of this
process should not be lost ...because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police
conduct will be encouraged. . . . [Slufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is
made unavailable to the prosecution in its ease in chief." 401 U.S. at 225. Accord, Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721 (1974).
101. 446 U.S. at 634 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
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tional liberties.0 3 Due to the Court's apparent dissatisfaction with the rule,
recent decisions indicate movement away from the normative and factual
justifications which gave rise to the rule. °4 Significant dissenting opinions
have vigorously lampooned this departure, emphasizing instead the con-
tinuing importance of judicial integrity and deterrence of police
misconduct."°  The Havens majority, however, narrowed the scope of the
exclusionary rule by extending the impeachment exception to cover matters
first elicited on cross-examination. °0
Although the exclusionary rule safeguards individual freedom from convic-
tions based on unlawfully gathered evidence,"° this protection must be bal-
anced against the public's interest in discovering the truth in criminal
trials."°  The Court's recent decisions have expanded the impeachment ex-
ception to advance the truth-seeking objective."° Each expansion, however,
103. The Burger Court's dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule is made apparent by its
decisions that expand the impeachment exception and thereby authorize the additional use of
unconstitutionally seized evidence. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1974); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The Court's present strategy, to gradually chip away at citizens'
rights to be free from unlawful searches and seizures, is elucidated in the dissenting opinions in
recent Supreme Court decisions. For reference to these opinions, see note 105 infra.
104. The movement away from the policies necessitating the exclusionary rule in the Court's
recent decisions has been a topic of interest to many commentators. See, e.g., Dershowitz &
Ely, supra note 47; Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Constitutional Rules, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1476 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 47; Comment, The
Impeachment Exception: Decline of the Exclusionary Rule?, 8 IND. L. REv. 865 (1975).
105. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 502 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 724 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. 446 U.S. at 627-28.
107. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (the Court indicated the consequence of
the rule is to create a "privilege against conviction [by] unconstitutional evidence"). See gener-
ally Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requium for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. I
[hereinafter cited as Allen]; Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on
the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 664 (1961).
108. The exclusionary rule often prohibits the use of evidence probative of a defendant's
guilt. The Government, in its brief before the Supreme Court, stated: "The determination of
truth at trial is the fundamental objective of our legal system, but . .. [exceptions must some-
times be made from [that goal] to give effect to other values deemed even more important."
Brief for Petitioner at 28.
109. The Court in Harris extended the impeachment exception mandated by Walder v.
United States, 367 U.S. 62 (1954), to include fifth amendment violations. See notes 41-46 and
accompanying text supra. The Harris Court reasoned:
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense or refuse to do
so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury.
Having voluntarily taken the stand, this petitioner was under an obligation to speak
truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the
traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process.
401 U.S. at 225 (citations omitted).
The Hass Court, finding no valid distinction between its decision and Harris, stated: "[W]e
are, after all, always engaged in a search for truth in a criminal case so long as the search is
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has resulted in the threat of more frequent use of illegally obtained evidence
to secure convictions."' The Havens decision overemphasized the defen-
dant's obligation to testify truthfully,", while it disregarded the officer's re-
sponsibility to act within the confines of the law."' Prior to Havens, when
the impeachment exception was more narrowly restricted, a police officer
had greater incentive to gather evidence through legal searches due to the
likelihood that evidence probative of guilt would be forever lost if illegally
procured. The impact of Havens, however, may be to encourage a conscious
disregard of constitutional restrictions by police due to the increased likeli-
hood that illegally seized evidence may be introduced at any trial in which
the accused testifies. This likelihood arises because prosecutors are no longer
required to wait for the defendant to provide contradictory statements dur-
ing direct and cross-examinations before tainted evidence is admissible.
Furthermore, the Havens decision nullifies the distinction traditionally
drawn between impeachment of direct examination and of cross-examination
testimony." 3 Prior to Havens, the scope of testimony subject to impeach-
ment by illegally seized evidence was narrowly confined to statements
offered during direct examination." ' There are two logical bases for such a
surrounded with the safeguards provided by our Constitution." 420 U.S. at 722. Consequently,
the Court indicated that the protections guaranteed by Miranda are not to be perverted into a
license to testify falsely. As a result, the Court declared that "[i]nadmissibility would pervert
the constitutional right into a right to falsify free from embarassment of impeachment evidence
from the defendant's own mouth." Id. at 723.
110. Recent commentators have projected this result from previous decisions expanding the
impeachment exception. See Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 47, at 1219. See also 3 LAFAVE,
supra note 2 at 703-705.
111. See notes 84 & 85 and accompanying text supra.
112. As the Court observed in Mapp: "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law
that set him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its
own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." 367 U.S. at 659. See
generally Allen, supra note 107; LaFave, Improving Police Perfornance Through the Exclusion-
ary Rule, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391 (1965); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the
Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961).
113. Prior Supreme Court decisions confined the impeachment exception to direct examina-
tion testimony. See notes 114-116 and accompanying text infra.
114. In Walder, the Court mandated use of illegally obtained physical evidence to impeach
the defendant's direct testimony. See note 35 and accompanying text supra. Both Harris and
Hass authorized impeachment of a defendant's direct testimony by a prior inconsistent state-
ment obtained in violation of Miranda. See notes 41-46 and accompanying text supra.
Due to the extension of the impeachment exception in Havens, illegally obtained evidence
will be admitted with greater frequency in all criminal trials. Police and prosecutors can plan to
disregard constitutional rights when obtaining evidence due to the high probability that such
evidence will be heard by the jury if the defendant testifies. The possibility of this type of
police conduct has been recognized and counsels the limitation of the scope of the impeachment
exception to direct examination testimony. See generally 3 LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 705; Note,
supra note 15, at 717.
In addition, as the Fifth Circuit in Havens clearly pointed out, extending the impeachment
exception to include matters first volunteered on cross-examination would subject the defendant
to impeachment no matter how he responded to the question posed, The court declared:
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limitation. First, the waiver doctrine, that a defendant waives his or her
constitutional right not to have illegally seized evidence admitted at trial to
impeach his or her credibility when he or she affirmatively resorts to
perjurous testimony,' is not clearly applicable when a defendant lies on
cross-examination in response to leading, and often delicate, questions pro-
pounded by the prosecution. That is, in the environment of cross-
examination, the elements of the waiver doctrine-that the defendant intel-
ligently and willingly relinquish a known right "'-are in most cases not
satisfied. Second, the deterrent objectives "' underpinning the rule require
limiting the impeachment exception to direct testimony."8  The Court
should have retained the rule limiting the impeachment exception to direct
testimony not only because it deters illegal police behavior but also because
under this rule the courts do not have to make the additional judgment of
what constitutes "reasonable suggestion" between direct and cross-
examination. This additional judgment will only make the administration of
the exclusionary rule more difficult and the results more inconsistent. The
Havens Court misconceived the meaningful distinction between impeach-
ment of testimony offered on direct and that offered on cross-examination
and impliedly overruled Agnello v. United States."'
According to the view of the trial judge and prosecutor, defendant could be asked
on cross-examination, a question, which answered affirmatively would admit the
incriminating tendencies of the illegal evidence, and, answered negatively would
allow the subsequent introduction of the illegal evidence for purposes of impeach-
ment. Such a view extends beyond the reach of Walder, Harris, and Hass.
592 F.2d at 852.
115. This doctrine was espoused in Walder to admit the illegally seized evidence for im-
peachment purposes. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
116. Answers offered by the defendant would seem to be less intelligently, knowingly, and
willingly made when the person posing the questions is the prosecutor rather than defense
counsel, with whom the testimony was probably rehearsed. See generally 3 LAFAVE, supra note
2, at 704; Note, supra note 15, at 719.
117. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
118. If the impeachment exception also operated on cross-examination, prosecutors would not
be compelled to wait for the defendant to offer perjurous testimony on direct examination
before tainted evidence would be admissible. In any criminal case in which the defendant took
the stand, the prosecution could elicit contradictory testimony and thus lay the groundwork for
impeachment. Illegally obtained evidence would be admitted with greater frequency in all crim-
inal trials and any deterrent effect that the exclusionary rule might have would be greatly
diminished. See Comment, Impeachment by Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence-The Ero-
sion of the Exclusionary Rule, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 706 (1973). See also 3 LAFAVE, supra note 2, at
704-05. However, in Harris, 401 U.S. at 225, and Hass, 420 U.S. at 723, the Court indicated
that the benefits of the impeachment process should not be lost due to the "speculative possibil-
ity" that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged. Both Harris and Hass have been
criticized severely for this argument. See generally Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 47; The
Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 47.
119. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). The Court in Havens, while distinguishing its holding from Agnello,
implicitly overruled the Agnello decision. Despite the factual similarities between Havens and
Agnello, the Court focused on minor distinctions between the two to justify a decision contrary
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A third deficiency in the Havens decision is that it may chill the willing-
ness of defendants to testify. After Havens, a defendant will be extremely
hesitant to take the stand if illegally procured evidence is available to contra-
dict any of the inferences that might flow from his or her declarations.
Further, the accused may be inhibited by fear that the fact-finder will ignore
limiting instructions and consider otherwise inadmissible evidence as proba-
tive of guilt.' These concerns are not idle speculations, because the
Court's expansion of the scope of cross-examination to include matters
reasonably suggested 121 by the defendant's direct testimony authorizes the
prosecutor to introduce improperly procured evidence under the guise of
"proper" cross-examination.
Another disturbing aspect of the Havens decision is that a future court
may extend the Havens rationale to permit impeachment of statements eli-
cited on cross-examination by pretrial statements obtained in violation of
Miranda." Due to the questionable trustworthiness of statements procured
to the one reached in Agnello. In both decisions, however, the Court addressed the issue of
whether it was permissible to admit unconstitutionally obtained evidence to rebut a defendant's
response to a matter first raised during cross-examination.
The reasoning employed by the Court in Havens appears similar to the approach the Burger
Court used to reverse the Warren Court determination that the first amendment protected
speech in shopping centers. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502-03 (1946), the Court held
that the proprietor of a company town was restricted by the first amendment's freedom of
speech provision because operation of a municipality was a "public function." Relying on
Marsh, the Warren Court, in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308, 318 (1968), held that because a shopping center was functionally equivalent to a
public business district, speech in shopping centers was also protected by the first amendment.
Four years later, however, the Burger Court upheld a restriction upon the distribution of leaf-
lets at a shopping center in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). The Court in Lloyd
did not overrule Logan Valley but distinguished it on the ground that the picketing in Logan
Valley related to store practices while the picketing in Lloyd did not. Id. at 560-61. In Hudgens
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the Court explained that the rationale in Lloyd was irreconcil-
able with that of Logan Valley and, therefore, precedent required that Logan Valley be over-
ruled.
By distinguishing Lloyd from Logan Valley and later recognizing that the cases were concep-
tually indistinguishable, the Court was able to reverse Logan Valley while maintaining that it
was nevertheless following precedent. A similar fate may befall Agnello. The Havens majority
attempted to distinguish Agnello, and did not, therefore, explicitly overrule it. See text accom-
panying note 70 supra. Later decisions, however, may recognize that the cases are factually
almost identical, and expressly overrule the Agnello decision.
120. Although evidence of prior inconsistent statements may be permitted into evidence
merely to attack a defendant's credibility, admission of such evidence may enhance the affirma-
tive elements of the prosecution's case in chief. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968) (limiting instructions to jury provide inadequate substitute for constitutional rights be-
cause jurors have difficulty disregarding evidence to establish guilt). In addition, several com-
mentators have expressed doubt as to the effectiveness of limiting instructions to the jury about
proper use of such evidence. See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
171-80 (1966); McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 59, at 136; Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its
Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REv. 264 (1967).
121. 446 U.S. at 627-28.
122. See note 43 supra.
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contrary to fifth amendment proscriptions,"'3 the breadth of Havens should
be limited to impeachment by unconstitutionally obtained physical evidence.
Finally, the Havens decision casts doubt on the probity of the judicial
system by upholding convictions procured through government
lawbreaking. ' The potential for joint police-court action undermines one of
the fundamental policies giving rise to the exclusionary rule-the imperative
of judicial integrity."5 The Court's expansion of the impeachment exception
condones illegal police behavior in gathering evidence by permitting the use
of this evidence in criminal trials. Due to this expansion, doubt is cast upon
the integrity of the judicial system.
A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The normative and factual justifications for the exclusionary rule enunci-
ated more than 60 years ago" remain vital justifications for the rule today.
Recent Supreme Court decisions eroding the exclusionary rule provide no
alternative to ensure the constitutional guarantees left unprotected by these
decisions. Replacement of the exclusionary rule with nonconstitutional rem-
edies has been attempted.17  These substitutions, however, have proven
inadequate. ' Chief Justice Burger, an outspoken opponent of the rule, has
suggested that the rule be retained until an effective replacement can be
developed.'9
123. For an in-depth discussion of the policy rationales underlying the fifth amendment ex-
clusionary rule, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
124. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); note
21 supra.
125. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
126. See notes 19-26 and accompanying text supra.
127. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., suggested that Congress attempt to develop an administrative or
quasi-judicial remedy against the government); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of
Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955) (tort remedy against offending officer); Com-
ment, Use of § 1983 to Remedy Unconstitutional Police Conduct: Guarding the Guards, 5
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 104 (1970) (§ 1983 authorizes civil tort suits in federal courts against
state law enforcement officers); Comment, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitu-
tional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968) (injunctions offer prospect of immediate relief
from unconstitutional conduct and powerful deterrent from engaging in that conduct).
128. Many factors contribute to the inadequacies of the remedies proposed to replace the
exclusionary rule. These include: lack of jury sympathy, Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Viola-
tions of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 499-501 (1955); judgment-proof police, Com-
ment, The Impeachment Exception: Decline of the Exclusionary Rule?, 8 IND. L. REV. 865, 877
(1975); sovereign immunity of states preventing vicarious liability, Greenhill & Murto, Gov-
ernmental Immunity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 462, 463-66 (1971); federal proposal fails to impose liabil-
ity on municipalities or state governments, Monroe v. Pape, 65 U.S. 167 (1961) (municipalities).
For a general overview of suggested replacements for the exclusionary rule, see Oaks, supra
note 5; Comment, The Impeachment Exception: Decline of the Exclusionary Rule?, 8 IND. L.
REV. 865 (1975).
129. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 420
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court, rather than emasculate the rule by further indirect
attacks, should re-emphasize the normative and factual justifications for the
rule. If constitutional rights are to be more than naked privileges, measur-
able consequences must be attached to their violation."3  Further, it is im-
perative that the Court employ a pragmatic procedure to enforce consis-
tently constitutional mandates.' Until an effective alternative to the rule is
developed, the doctrine should not be eroded.
CONCLUSION
With United States v. Havens, control of the exclusionary rule passes into
the prosecutor's hands in cases in which the accused testifies. The Havens
Court departed from precedent by extending the impeachment exception to
include testimony first elicited during cross-examination. As a result, a de-
fendant who takes the stand will be subject to impeachment by a multitude
of inferences flowing from his or her direct testimony. Additionally, the de-
cision weakens police incentive to gather evidence in accordance with consti-
tutional dictates. Moreover, a defendant will be compelled to refrain from
testifying on his or her own behalf to avoid being convicted on the basis of
unlawfully seized evidence.
The impact of Havens will be a reduction in the effectiveness of the exclu-
sionary rule, as well as a diminution of the constitutional protections guaran-
teed the criminally accused. It is urged that rather than erode the rule by
further indirect attacks, the Supreme Court re-emphasize the policy
rationales that necessitated the rule. Only then will the Court arrive at the
proper balance of competing societal interests which were safeguarded by
the exclusionary rule.
Davi Lynn Hirsch
130. Professor Oaks, supra note 5, at 756, recommended that:
The exclusionary rule should not be abolished until there is something to take its
place and perform its two essential functions. If constitutional rights are to be any-
thing more than pious pronouncements, then some measurable consequence must
be attached to their violation. . . . It is [ilmperative to have a practical procedure
by which courts can review alleged violations of constitutional rights and articulate
the meaning of those rights. . . . The exclusionary rule . . . provides an occasion for
judicial review, and gives credibility to the constitutional guarantees.
131. See Oaks, supra note 5, at 756.
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